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ABSTRACT
Social and medical scientists frequently produce empirical generalizations that
involve concepts partly defined by value judgments. These generalizations,
which have been called ‘mixed claims’, raise interesting questions. Does the
presence of them in science imply that science is value-laden? Is the value-
ladenness of mixed claims special compared to other kinds of value-ladenness
of science? Do we lose epistemically if we reformulate these claims as
conditional statements? And if we want to allow mixed claims in science, do
we need a new account of how to reconcile values with objectivity?
Alexandrova (2017. A Philosophy of the Science of Well-being. New York: OUP,
2018. “Can the Science of Well-Being Be Objective?” The British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science 69 (2): 421–445) offers affirmative answers to these
questions. In responding to Alexandrova’s arguments, this short discussion
note motivates negative ones and in doing so casts new light on mixed claims.
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1. Introduction
While some theorists might still hold that science is and ought to be free of
non-epistemic values (e.g. moral, prudential, political, or aesthetic values)
(Staddon 2001; Betz 2013), many philosophers have provided arguments
to the effect that science neither is nor should be free of them (Longino
2002; Douglas 2009; Brown 2019; Peters forthcoming). Anna Alexandrova
(2017, 2018) offers an important contribution to the debate. She first notes
that social and medical scientists frequently produce empirical generaliz-
ations involving concepts such as, for instance, ‘well-being’, ‘unemploy-
ment’, ‘equality’, ‘health’, etc. Here are two examples:
(1) ‘Unemployment negatively affects individuals’ well-being’ (Voßemer
et al. 2017, 1).
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(2) ‘Economic growthmay conflict with greater equality’ (Sloman 2007, 201).
Alexandrova then argues that since concepts such as, for instance, ‘well-
being’, ‘unemployment’, ‘equality’, etc. rely on value judgments about what
counts as well-being, unemployment, equality, etc., the generalizations at
issue ‘present a special case of value-ladenness’ in science (2018, 421).
She calls these generalizations mixed claims, as they combine empirical
information about causal or statistical relations with value-based definitions.
Mixed claims pose serious risks. For they appear to capture conclusions
based solely on science, objectivity, and evidence even though they are in
fact partly dependent on value judgments. This may mislead scientists and
the public about the generality, authority, and neutrality of the claims at
issue. Since, in some fields, ‘almost every empirical study’ makes mixed
claims (McClimans 2019, 350), how should we deal with them?
Alexandrova (2018) argues that, ‘[a]gainst the prevailing wisdom, […]
we should not seek to eliminate them from science’ but ‘develop prin-
ciples for their legitimate use’ (421). She adds that while ‘[p]hilosophers
of science have already reconciled values with objectivity in several
ways’, ‘none of the existing proposals are suitable for mixed claims’
(2018, 421). A new account is thus needed, Alexandrova claims.
I shall take a critical look at her argument. In doing so, I aim to provide
answers to the following four questions that should be of more general
interest for philosophers working on values in science.
(1) Does the presence of mixed claims in science imply that science is
value-laden?
(2) Is the value-ladenness of mixed claims special compared to other
kinds of value-ladenness of science?
(3) Do we lose epistemically if we reformulate mixed claims as conditional
statements?
(4) If we want to allowmixed claims in science, do we need a new account
of how to reconcile values with objectivity?
Alexandrova offers affirmative answers to [1] to [4]. I shall motivate
negative ones.
2. Do mixed claims imply that science is value-laden?
Before addressing the question, some background first. For Alexandrova, a
‘claim is mixed’ iff ‘[i]t is an empirical hypothesis about a putative causal or
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statistical relation’, and ‘[a]t least one of the variables in this hypothesis is
defined in a way that presupposes a moral, prudential, political, or aes-
thetic value judgement about the nature of this variable’ (2018, 424).
While she takes her argument to hold for mixed claims in general, Alexan-
drova focuses (just as I do here) only on mixed claims from the science of
well-being, which spans the social and medical sciences. Her examples
include
(a) ‘Happiness is not always conducive to well-being.’
(b) ‘Early learning difficulties have a disproportionate impact on life well-
being.’ (2018, 424)
With respect to (a) and (b), Alexandrova notes that psychologists tend
to distinguish three different notions of well-being: (i) happiness or a
favourable balance of positive over negative emotions, (ii) life-satisfaction,
captured in individuals’ judgements about how their life is going overall,
and (iii) flourishing or good functioning, an ensemble of strengths such
as competence, relatedness, sense of achievement and meaning. Alexan-
drova argues that settling on one of (i)-(iii) ‘requires a choice about the
most plausible conception of well-being’, which in turn requires a value
judgment on what is good for people (2018, 425). Thus, she continues,
‘empirical generalizations’ such as, for instance, (a) and (b) ‘present a
special case of value-ladenness’ of science: on her view, mixed claims
imply that values ‘enter science’ (2018, 421, 426).
Alexandrova isn’t alone in inferring that since the definition of concepts
such as well-being, inequality, etc. depends on value judgments,
any science involving these concepts is itself value-laden. This kind of
inference also seems to underlie, for instance, Kincaid, Dupre, and
Wylie’s (2007) view that ‘value-laden science shows up’ inter alia when
‘values [are] involved in deciding what categories or basic objects
constitute the area to be studied’ (12). Similarly, Beckerman (2017), an
economist, claims that in an analysis of, say, the economic inequality in
society, there are different ways of measuring that inequality. And for
their analysis, economists must select a ‘particular definition’ in the light
of their ‘value judgement as to which definition is more important’;
hence ‘positive economics cannot be value-free, since the way the […]
variables [in economic analyses] are defined depend[s] partly on subjec-
tive value judgements’ (2017, 22). That is, Beckerman concludes that
since values come in when scientists define concepts such as
economic equality, unemployment etc., the scientific reasoning and
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empirical generalizations that subsequently involve them are themselves
value-laden.
However, it does not follow that when the definition of scientific con-
cepts relies on values, that the science involving these concepts is itself
value-laden. This arguably only follows if the process of defining the con-
cepts is part of science, and, importantly, whether that is so can’t be deter-
mined simply by turning to the facts of the world. That is because what
belongs to science and what doesn’t depends on what we mean by
‘science’. And the question of what is and isn’t properly called ‘science’
(vs. mere ‘pseudo-science’) is, given the term’s normatively loaded and
rhetorically powerful nature, a well-known controversial issue ultimately
settled by a value judgement pertaining to what we perceive to be the
most plausible notion of ‘science’ (Godfrey-Smith 2003, 3; Hansson 2017).
Suppose, for instance, that we hold that the process of defining con-
cepts is not part of but precedes, and is situated outside, science proper.
The view isn’t outlandish. In a similar vein, Longino (1990, 85f) proposes
that when scientists identify their object of study and define their con-
cepts, this happens at an ‘external’ stage of science. Douglas (2000)
adds that even when that stage is affected by non-epistemic values, the
‘“internal” process of scientific reasoning’, i.e. the testing, justification,
and analysis, can then still ‘go forward without the necessary inclusion
of non-epistemic values’ (564). Because if the concepts are defined
upfront and their definitions remain explicit in the subsequent reasoning
and data assessment, then that reasoning and data processing, including
the conclusions, are relativized to the definitions, and hold (or don’t hold)
independently of whether the scientists using the concepts endorse the
value judgments shaping the concepts’ definitions (Nagel 1961, 486).
Hence, the subsequent science involving these concepts would remain
value-free. While Longino and Douglas assume that the definitional
work at issue still takes place within science (albeit at an ‘external’ stage
of it), there is no obvious reason speaking against pushing the ‘externali-
zation’ a step further and situating that work outside of science.
Having said that, I do not mean to deny that it is plausible to view the
definitional process as a proper part of science. My point is dialectical. It is
just that when theorists infer that science is value-laden because it
involves concepts that are defined partly via value judgments, then that
inference rests itself on a value judgment pertaining to what is a proper
part of science and what isn’t. It rests on the judgment that the most plaus-
ible concept of science is one according to which the process of defining
these concepts is a proper part of science. We might accept that value
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judgment. But as noted, the opposite view that the definitional process is
not part of but prior to science isn’t obviously false. And, crucially, if that
alternative view is right, then the subsequent scientific research with the
concepts at issue can be conducted without endorsing the values
shaping the definition of the concepts. The fact that values affect the
definition of certain scientific concepts thus doesn’t by itself imply that
the science and mixed claims involving these concepts are themselves
value-laden.
3. Are mixed claims special?
Suppose mixed claims and the science in which they figure are value-
laden. To show that their value-ladenness is ‘special’ and ‘unique’, Alexan-
drova (2018, 426f) argues that the values underlying them function differ-
ently from more familiar values in science. The familiar functional roles
that she considers are values as
(1) reasons to pursue science,
(2) ethical constraints on scientific research and research protocols,
(3) arbiters between underdetermined theories,
(4) determinants of standards of confirmation,
(5) the source of wishful thinking/fraud in the sciences, and
(6) agenda-setters (2018, 226–428).
To assess Alexandrova’s view about the specialness of mixed claims, I
shall focus on (6). What are agenda-setting values?
Alexandrova writes that they are ‘normative commitments’ indicating
to scientists what ‘phenomena are interesting, important, and worth
studying’ (2018, 426). She argues that we should ‘distinguish this
agenda-setting function of values from their role in mixed claims’
because there can be ‘moral and political reasons to initiate a scientific
study of human and animal well-being, but these reasons alone do not
force us to go mixed. We could instead insist on new value-free definitions
of well-being’ (2018, 427). Alexandrova takes this to show that the value-
ladenness related to mixed claims is distinct from that related to agenda-
setting values.
However, we should keep the view that (a) all agenda-setting values
lead to mixed claims separate from the view that (b) all mixed claims
are based on agenda-setting values. Alexandrova is right that (a) is false.
But to establish that the values underlying mixed claims are functionally
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special and unique compared to the mentioned familiar values, she would
need to show that (b) is false also. Otherwise, we are free to hold that the
values underlying mixed claims are agenda-setting values too. Yet, Alexan-
drova doesn’t provide an argument against (b). Moreover, there is reason
to hold that (b) is correct. For in shaping scientists’ definitions, the values
underlying mixed claims do narrow down the scope of phenomena that
the scientists will then focus on (Longino 1990, 98f). For instance, if, in
their project to investigate well-being, scientists choose, say, life-satisfac-
tion as the most plausible conception of well-being, they therewith
select one phenomenon (i.e. life-satisfaction) for investigation over
another one (say, happiness). Since the values at issue direct scientists’
attention toward one phenomenon rather than another, they are in a
straightforward way determining scientists’ research agenda. Their func-
tional role is thus not special compared to that of the values already
explored in philosophy of science, for values that set research agendas
and determine the selection of phenomena for investigation have
already been discussed (Longino 1990; Lacey 1997; Kitcher 2011;
Douglas 2016).
4. Do we lose epistemically if we reformulate mixed claims?
Alexandrova holds that mixed claims are legitimate in science and should
stay. She makes her point indirectly by arguing that the most explicit case
against mixed claims, which she takes to be offered by Nagel (1961), is
unsuccessful. To see her point, it will be useful to first consider Nagel’s
view on value judgments.
Nagel distinguishes between ‘estimating’ value judgments, which
merely capture whether ‘some commonly recognized type of action,
object, or institution is embodied in a given instance’, and ‘appraising’
value judgments, which ‘express approval or disapproval of some
moral or social ideal, or of some action (or institution) because of com-
mitment to such an ideal’ (1961, 492f). If we apply this distinction to
judgments about well-being, then social scientists would form estimat-
ing value judgments when they are using a particular given account
of well-being to judge how much a person or community exhibits the
features this account considers constitutive of well-being. In contrast,
they would form appraising value judgments when they take a
subjective stance on what well-being is, where this involves approving
and favoring a notion of well-being, and then using it to judge
whether a person or community is doing well.
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Alexandrova argues that Nagel distinguishes between estimating and
appraising value judgments to ‘eliminate appraisal from science, leaving
only estimation’ because the ‘ideal science for him is an ethically neutral
one’ (2018, 429).1 She continues that Nagelians would most likely
conduct such elimination by converting mixed claims from regular
causal or correlational ones into conditional claims as follows. For any
mixed claim involving a cause or a correlation, C, a value-based concept, T, and
an operationalization, O of T: (1) Scientists can investigate estimation claims: ‘If T
is operationalized as O, then C’. (2) Scientists cannot investigate appraisal claims
that have not been so conditionalized. (2018, 430)
If scientists adopted this method, Alexandrova holds, then, since their
claims would always be tied to specific operationalizations of T, their
claims involving T would remain value-neutral.
Her argument against this Nagelian reformulation of mixed claims is
that it doesn’t really remove values from science but ‘only pushes them
to another, less appropriate stage’, as there ‘would still remain a question
as to which normative standard’ and ‘operationalizations’ scientists ‘should
use in their estimation claims’ (2018, 430). On behalf of the Nagelian, Alex-
androva considers and rejects three possible answers to that question.
The first one is the suggestion that Nagelian reformulations of ‘mixed
claims could be rendered value free’, that is, free from scientists’ own
value judgments, if scientists operationalized their value-based concepts
by ‘using the value judgements of the community they studied’
(2018, 430). Alexandrova rejects this proposal because the ‘folk disagree
[on matters such as well-being etc.] even within one community and
any proposal for how such a disagreement can be resolved is itself norma-
tive’ (2018, 430).
However, the point isn’t entirely convincing. After all, scientists might,
for instance, focus on a common notion of well-being, or on the notion
that the majority of the members of the community endorse. Or they
might index their operationalization with details about the distribution
of how many people endorse or reject a particular concept of well-
being. In each of these cases, the scientists’ own values wouldn’t enter
the research via the operationalizations.
The second proposal that Alexandrova considers on behalf of the Nage-
lian is that scientists working on well-being could be asked to ‘study the
1But notice that Nagel is in fact explicit that his goal is merely to consider whether or not ‘an ethically
neutral social science is inherently impossible’ (1961, 495). This does not require, and he does not
make, any claim about the ‘ideal science’.
INQUIRY 7
empirical relations between well-being and a given factor on all the exist-
ing views of well-being’ (2018, 431). She rejects this proposal too arguing
that there are numerous theories of well-being, and using them all for the
operationalizations is ‘impossible, but a choice requires a normative judge-
ment about their relative plausibility’ (2018, 431).
However, this needn’t be the case. Scientists might select a particular
operationalization O simply because a given problem hasn’t been
explored with respect to O yet. The value motivating scientists to select
O may then just be the goodness of thoroughly exploring an area of
research, which is an epistemic value perfectly legitimate in science.
And even if scientists do make value judgements about the plausibility
or importance of theories and concepts of well-being, this is
arguably entirely acceptable for Nagelians. For, as Nagel (1961) notes,
when ‘social scientists address [themselves] exclusively to matters which
[they] believe are important because of their assumed relevance to
[their] cultural values’, this ‘represents no obstacle to the successful
pursuit of objectively controlled inquiry’ provided the mentioned opera-
tionalization occurs (486). The conceptual choice that Alexandrova high-
lights thus wouldn’t necessarily involve a ‘value judgement that the
Nagelian hopes to keep out of science’ (2018, 431).
She considers a third proposal on how Nagelians might settle which
operationalizations scientists should use. It involves the idea of a ‘division
of labor’, according to which:
scientists take care of facts, while others take care of values. […] [T]he right stan-
dard of well-being to use in the science of well-being is within the purview of
moral philosophers (and/or democratic decision-makers). Scientists can partici-
pate in this discussion, but not qua scientists. (2018)
Alexandrova’s point against this proposal is also her main reason why
mixed claims should stay in science. It is the thought that the view that
scientists take care of facts while others take care of values,
ignores or devalues scientists’ knowledge about values, which they have
acquired in virtue of their knowledge of facts. This knowledge enables them
to make better normative choices qua scientists. It is because developmental
psychologists know the effect of, say, institutionalization of orphans that they
believe attachment to be crucial to child well-being. Similarly, it is because
divorce scholars know the consequences of divorce that they conceptualize it
as an opportunity for personal growth and not merely a loss […]. (2018)
The ‘Nagelian division of labour’, Alexandrova continues, ‘wastes the
normative knowledge scientists acquire while in the business of producing
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mixed claims. That much is sufficient for a prima facie case that mixed
claims are worth preserving’, she concludes (2018, 432).
However, the envisaged division of labour needn’t involve ignoring or
wasting scientists’ normative knowledge. For, on the labor-division view,
as Alexandrova notes herself, the job of moral philosophers and/or demo-
cratic decision-makers is to ‘take care of values’: their job is to form good
normative judgments. If scientists make better normative choices qua
scientists, then it seems clear that it is the job of moral philosophers
and/or democratic decision-makers to not ignore or waste the scientists’
better normative knowledge but consider it when it is relevant. On the
envisaged labor-division view, moral philosophers and/or democratic
decision-makers wouldn’t do their job properly if they overlooked the
scientists’ special normative knowledge. The proposed labor-division
thus needn’t result in discounting scientists’ normative knowledge, and
we wouldn’t necessarily lose epistemically if mixed claims were reformu-
lated in the Nagelian manner.
5. Do we need a new approach to reconciling values with
objectivity?
Alexandrova holds that while ‘philosophers of science have already recon-
ciled values with objectivity in several ways, none of the existing proposals
are suitable for mixed claims’ (2018, 421) because they fail to solve the fol-
lowing two problems related to mixed claims:
Inattention: Scientists might present empirical findings while failing to note the
normative assumptions on which the findings depend, which may lead to a
misuse of the authority of science.
Imposition: Scientists might import into ‘science substantive views about the
nature of [e.g.] well-being that those whose well-being is being studied have
good reasons to reject. When eminent economists […] advocate a measure of
national well-being that takes into account only the average ratio of positive
to negative emotions of the populace […], the citizens can legitimately object
if they take well-being to consist in more than that’ (2018, 432f)
However, against Alexandrova’s claim that existing proposals on how to
reconcile values with objectivity aren’t suitable for mixed claims as they
can’t adequately deal with Inattention and Imposition, for instance, Nagel’s
(1961) proposal does in fact already both allow for mixed claims in science
and help tackle these two problems. For suppose a scientist S reformulates
the mixed claim
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[C] ‘Happiness isn’t always conducive to well-being’
as
[R] ‘If well-being is operationalized as life-satisfaction, happiness isn’t
always conducive to well-being’.
[R] might still rest on a value judgment equating well-being with life-sat-
isfaction. Suppose it does. [R] will then still be a ‘mixed claim’, i.e. an
empirical hypothesis about a statistical relation containing a variable
partly defined by a value judgement (Alexandrova 2018, 424). Yet, it will
be a mixed claim that Nagelians would treat as entirely acceptable in
science and that would actually help prevent Inattention. Because if S clari-
fies at the outset and in the conclusions of her research that her research
pertains to well-being construed as life-satisfaction only then the relative
character of S’s findings remains clearly in view.
Moreover, in disallowing ‘appraisal claims’ in science in the first place
(Nagel 1961, 492f; Alexandrova 2018, 430), the Nagelian proposal also
counteracts Imposition: if it is ensured that scientists don’t make claims
to the effect that one particular notion of well-being is the best or most
plausible one then, for instance, eminent economists can’t advocate any
particular measure of national well-being, and so can’t impose their own
concept of well-being on others.2
Granted, for Alexandrova, this has the negative side effect that scientists’
(possibly) superior normative knowledge is wasted. But, as argued above,
that needn’t be the case. Provided thatmoral philosophers and/or democratic
decision-makers do their job of forming good normative judgments about
the nature of well-being (etc.) properly, they will need to take the scientists’
normative knowledge into account if it is superior. The Nagelian proposal
thus allows mixed claims in science and helps prevent both Inattention and
Imposition. Alexandrova’s view, that ‘none of the existing proposals [on how
to reconcile values with objectivity] are suitable for mixed claims’ (2018,
430)because they fail todealwith Inattentionand Imposition is thus toostrong.
2Imposition might be interpreted as the problem that when a group of (e.g.) well-being scientists who
accept relatively homogeneous values operationalize well-being in ways that is unresponsive to the
public’s view then the public may as a result not have access to science that is responsive to their con-
cerns. However, it is worth noting that objectivity doesn’t require that the public get access to knowledge
that is relevant to them. If a small scientific elite only conducted research grounded (explicitly) in an
obscure theory of well-being, there would be many valid (e.g. moral) criticisms that we could make
of such an arrangement. But there needn’t be any failure of objectivity: the scientists might produce
perfectly objective knowledge operating within their conceptualization of well-being. The problem at
issue would then no longer call for an account reconciling objectivity with values.
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6. Conclusion
While the preceding discussion focused on Alexandrova’s view on mixed
claims, the conclusions are of more general interest for the theorizing on
values in science and science communication. This is because they help
advance the analysis ofmixed claims in the followingways. First, the presence
of these claims in sciencedoesn’t by itself imply that science is value-laden, for
the definition of the concepts figuring in mixed claims can be viewed as a
process prior to rather than part of science.While that viewmight be rejected,
the key point here has just been that doing so will itself partly depend on a
value judgment about the most plausible notion of ‘science’, illustrating
that the theorizing on values in science involves values and mixed claims
itself. Second, the role of the values underlying mixed claims in science isn’t
special compared to already familiar functions of values in science. Rather, it
is functionally on a par with that of agenda-setting values. This is because in
shaping the definition of scientific concepts, the values underlying mixed
claims guide scientific inquiry. Third, we don’t necessarily incur epistemic
costs if we reformulate mixed claims as conditional statements. In fact, such
a reformulation helps to accommodate mixed claims in science and to
address two significant problems with them (Inattantion and Imposition). A
new account of how to reconcile values with objectivity so as to deal with
these problems might thus not be needed. Nonetheless, while I have indi-
cated various doubts about Alexandrova’s argument, she does us a valuable
service in highlighting the issue and risks of mixed claims. This is because
scientists and science communicators do currently still often fail to make
their operationalizations and value judgements explicit when producing
mixed claims. Alexandrova rightly draws attention to this point.
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